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Abstract
Generally, democratic regime type is positively associated with participating in international environmen-
tal agreements. In this context, this study focuses on the legal nature of an agreement, which is linked
to audience costs primarily at the domestic level that occur in case of non-compliance and are felt espe-
cially by democracies. Eventually, more legalized (“hard-law”) treaties make compliance potentially more
challenging and democratic leaders may anticipate the corresponding audience costs, which decreases the
likelihood that democracies select themselves into such treaties. The empirical implication of our theory
follows that environmental agreements with a larger share of democratic members are less likely to be
characterized by hard law. This claim is tested using quantitative data on global environmental treaties.
The results strongly support our argument, shed new light on the relationship between participation in
international agreements and the form of government, and also have implications for the “words-deeds”
debate in international environmental policy-making.
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1 Introduction
Many of the current environmental issues are of a transnational nature and cannot be addressed by states
unilaterally or solely at the domestic level. Protection of the ozone layer, addressing transboundary air
pollution, and fighting climate change are just a few of those environmental matters that require several
nations’ coordinated efforts at the international level. Arguably, the most prominent and perhaps even
necessary instruments for such efforts are international agreements, i.e., formal treaties between two or more
states for dealing with an environmental issue, which countries can commit to and participate in (e.g.,
Martin, 1993, 2000; Fearon, 1998; Leeds, 1999; Schneider and Urpelainen, 2013). These agreements might
pool resources, coordinate state policies, and thus provide cooperative gains for their members, although they
impose costs as well on, e.g., countries’ sovereignty and decision-making power.
The existing work primarily focuses on three clusters that help explaining state participation in inter-
national (environmental) agreements:1 (1) treaty design characteristics, (2) domestic influences, and (3)
systemic factors (e.g., Abbott et al., 2000; Abbott and Snidal, 2000; Congleton, 1992; Frank, 1999; Fredriks-
son and Gaston, 2000; Neumayer, 2002a,b; Murdoch, Sandler and Vijverberg, 2003; Beron, Murdoch and
Vijverberg, 2003; Roberts, Parks and Va´squez, 2004; Goodliffe and Hawkins, 2006; Fredriksson, Neumayer
and Ujhelyi, 2007; von Stein, 2008; Bernauer et al., 2010; Perrin and Bernauer, 2010; Bernauer et al., 2013;
Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006, 2008; Lantis, 2009; Lupu, 2014;
Pollack, 2015; Shaffer and Pollack, 2010, 2011). The following article focuses primarily on a combination of
the first and the second cluster. That is, previous work has repeatedly shown that democracies are more
likely than other regime types to cooperate via and commit to international environmental treaties (e.g.,
Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002; Neumayer, 2002a; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006, 2008; Ba¨ttig and
Bernauer, 2009; Lantis, 2009; Bernauer et al., 2010; Bernauer, Bo¨hmelt and Koubi, 2013; Spilker and Koubi,
2016). Theoretically, Mattes and Rodr´ıguez (2014, p.528) summarize that “[d]emocracies’ superior track
record [in international cooperation] is usually attributed to three institutional factors [...]: accountability of
leaders, limited decision-making flexibility, and transparency.” Specifically, it is argued that democracies are
more likely than non-democratic regimes to provide public goods for their constituency; and since environ-
mental quality is just a specific kind of public good, democracies are then also more inclined to cooperate
in international problem-solving efforts as this may signal the willingness to ensure that good’s provision
(e.g., Congleton, 1992; Ba¨ttig and Bernauer, 2009; Bernauer et al., 2010). In addition, citizens can express
their preferences better in democracies and they benefit from a higher “flow of information.” This should
translate into more international cooperation over environmental problems as well, since citizens will demand
this from their democratic governments (e.g., Congleton, 1992; Ba¨ttig and Bernauer, 2009; Bernauer et al.,
1Note that “participation” refers to (1) states that were involved in drafting an agreement and then ratified it and (2)
those countries that were not involved in negotiating a treaty, but joined it afterwards (nonetheless). Hence, it captures states’
continued involvement in an agreement and only ends when a country leaves a treaty. Empirically, participation in our case
refers to the members of a global environmental treaty – those that have ratified it (signature alone is insufficient) – by the end
of 2006 (see Bernauer et al., 2013).
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2010). Ba¨ttig and Bernauer (2009, p.285) focus on climate change and consequently conclude that “both
the demand for, and supply of, climate mitigation measures are likely to be stronger in democracies.” And
Neumayer (2002a, p.139) stresses that “the spread of democracy around the world will lead to enhanced
environmental commitment [i.e., treaty participation] worldwide.”
Clearly, however, not all democracies participate in any agreement under all circumstances. The following
research takes this as a motivation as we address the question of how democratic members’ participation in
international environmental treaties is related to “hard-law designs,” i.e., environmental agreement legal-
ization that is characterized by obligation, precision, and delegation (e.g., Abbott et al., 2000; Abbott and
Snidal, 2000; Shaffer and Pollack, 2010, 2011). We ultimately argue that environmental agreements formed
among a larger share of democracies are less likely to be characterized by hard law than soft law, i.e., democ-
racies are less likely to participate in more legalized (hard-law) treaties. The underlying theoretical argument
for this empirical implication focuses on the likely costs stemming from agreement non-compliance that are
imposed by international and, primarily, domestic audiences: democratic leaders may anticipate the costs
of not complying with an environmental treaty. But audience costs, in particular domestic ones, are higher
in democratic than non-democratic regimes, and it is anticipated that a hard-law design makes full treaty
compliance more challenging due to more constraining obligations or less flexibility in decision-making. In
combination, democracies will select themselves strategically into soft-law treaties, which allow maintaining
flexibility and decision-making power, while the chances of treaty violation and, therefore, the risk of audience
costs are lower.
The empirical analysis employs quantitative data by Bernauer et al. (2013) on global environmental
agreements since 1950. Using a binary indicator for hard law as the dependent variable, we find that our
core explanatory variable measuring the proportion of democracies participating in a treaty is negatively
related to this item. Hence, democracies are less likely to select themselves into more legalized treaties. The
confidence in this result is further supported as we control for several alternative determinants of design
or legalization and democracies’ self-selection into an agreement (membership or participation), and by an
extensive list of robustness checks that we discuss in the article’s appendix. Ultimately, this research makes
three central contributions to the literature. First, we shed new light on the relationship between democracy
and environmental treaty participation as well as design. This may also influence the literature on treaty
ratification more generally and has crucial influences for policymakers and public institutions. Derived
from this, secondly, our work potentially contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of environmental
agreements. As Miles et al. (2001) show, there is a strong link between the design of an institution and its
effectiveness. An implication of our work is that democracies tend to “soften-up” environmental agreements,
which in turn may eventually lower an institution’s performance. Finally, we contribute to the debate on
“screening” (i.e., the selection into an international agreement) and “constraining” (i.e., whether a treaty
actually can change state behavior and enforce compliance even if a state’s (short-term) interest depart from
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the agreement requirements) effects in international politics. In line with research on military alliances,
we find that “states with the greatest likelihood of being constrained are more carefully screened” (Chiba,
Johnson and Leeds, 2015, p.968). The conclusion further discusses how this is connected to the “words-deeds”
debate in global environmental policy-making (e.g., Ba¨ttig and Bernauer, 2009).
2 States’ Participation in Environmental Treaties
A review of the literature highlights that states participate in international (environmental) agreements as
long as the benefits stemming from accession outweigh the costs (Roberts, Parks and Va´squez, 2004; Bernauer
et al., 2010; Wangler, Altamirano-Cabrera and Weikard, 2013; Kelley and Pevehouse, 2015; Pollack, 2015).
Against this background, there are primarily three clusters of determinants that may influence countries’
evaluation of costs and benefits associated with an agreement and, hence, participating in international
environmental treaties. First, international agreements vary considerably in their design (e.g., Abbott et al.,
2000; Abbott and Snidal, 2000; Shaffer and Pollack, 2010, 2011). Institutions can be highly legalized if they
are characterized by clear obligations (i.e., an institution’s rules can be enforced upon its members), are
precise (i.e., rules are clearly and unambiguously defined), and delegate authority to a supranational body
(i.e., a dispute-settlement third-party that has authority to implement, interpret, and apply rules). Following
Abbott et al. (2000), hard law describes highly legalized treaties, while soft law does not have a strong degree
of legalization. In general, states are more reluctant to participate in more legalized, i.e., hard-law agreements
(e.g., Wagner, 2001; Bernauer et al., 2010, 2013; Spilker and Koubi, 2016), while there is also evidence that
hard law is less likely to diffuse within the network of environmental treaties (e.g., Bo¨hmelt and Spilker,
2016).
Second, there are domestic-level characteristics such as political regime type, institutional constraints, or
countries’ economic conditions. As summarized above, it is argued that democracies are more likely than
non-democratic regimes to participate in international environmental agreements (e.g., Neumayer, 2002a,b;
Fredriksson and Gaston, 2000; von Stein, 2008; Bernauer et al., 2010; Elsig, Milewicz and Stu¨rchler, 2011;
Milewicz and Elsig, 2014; Carbonell and Allison, 2015). Other research looks authoritarian states and finds
that there is significant variation in the participation behavior among them (e.g., Leinaweaver, 2012; Mattes
and Rodr´ıguez, 2014). Further influences at the domestic level pertain to interest groups and veto play-
ers (e.g., Fredriksson and Gaston, 2000; Roberts, Parks and Va´squez, 2004; Bernhagen, 2008; Urpelainen,
2010; Bernauer, Bo¨hmelt and Koubi, 2013; Hugh-Jones, Milewicz and Ward, 2016), electoral systems, elec-
tion periods and constitutional institutions (e.g., Cazals and Sauquet, 2015; Kelley and Pevehouse, 2015;
Kiesow Cortez and Gutmann, 2015), income levels (e.g., Bernauer et al., 2010; Haftel and Thompson, 2013),
and military or economic power aspects (e.g., Elsig, Milewicz and Stu¨rchler, 2011; Haftel and Thompson,
2013; Milewicz and Elsig, 2014).
Finally, there are systemic factors. For example, it is suggested that a state’s degree of cooperative be-
Democratic Self-Selection into Environmental Treaty Design 5
havior is influenced by other nations (e.g., Fredriksson and Gaston, 2000; Neumayer, 2002a,b; Roberts, Parks
and Va´squez, 2004; Fredriksson, Neumayer and Ujhelyi, 2007; von Stein, 2008; Bernauer et al., 2010). This
“international policy diffusion occurs when government policy decisions in a given country are systematically
conditioned by prior policy choices made in other countries” (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006, p.787).
The contingent behavior of states also incorporates dependencies between states and third-party countries,
i.e., “power politics” (e.g., Schneider and Urpelainen, 2013; Milewicz and Snidal, 2016), linkages based on
states’ colonial past (e.g., Elsig, Milewicz and Stu¨rchler, 2011; Milewicz and Elsig, 2014), or geographical
distance and economic factors such as income size, joint trade agreements, and trade openness (e.g., Vogel,
2000; Neumayer, 2002b; Besedesˇ, Johnson and Tian, 2016). Similarly, economic globalization (see, e.g., Elsig,
Milewicz and Stu¨rchler, 2011; Milewicz and Elsig, 2014) or the involvement in international organizations are
crucial factors (see, e.g., Bernauer et al., 2010; Spilker, 2013; Bernauer, Bo¨hmelt and Koubi, 2013; Yamagata,
Yang and Galaskiewicz, 2013; Bo¨hmelt and Vollenweider, 2015; Bo¨hmelt and Spilker, 2016).
In sum, the literature has produced strong theoretical arguments that help explaining why states partici-
pate in what kind of environmental agreements, and found robust empirical findings that support the claims.
Most importantly for our work, there is nearly universal consensus in the literature that democratic forms
of government are strongly linked to the participation in international environmental problem-solving efforts
(e.g., Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002; Neumayer, 2002a; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006, 2008; Ba¨ttig
and Bernauer, 2009; Lantis, 2009; Bernauer et al., 2010; Bernauer, Bo¨hmelt and Koubi, 2013; Spilker and
Koubi, 2016). The quote from Neumayer (2002a, p.139), i.e., “the spread of democracy around the world
will lead to enhanced environmental commitment worldwide,” emphasizes this again. However, this does not
explain why several democracies frequently decide not to participate in international environmental agree-
ments, e.g., the US not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol or the Convention on Biological Diversity, Switzerland
not participating in any of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea agreements, or Israel (despite
signing it) refraining from ratifying the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. We seek
to address this puzzle by focusing more strongly on treaty design and democracies, thus analyzing variation
in the degree of environmental agreements’ legalization as determined by democratic states’ participation in
them more carefully and systematically than before.
3 Theoretical Argument
Governments as official state representatives can participate in international environmental agreements, im-
plement them at their national level in turn, and they are those actors that can make the decision to leave
a treaty. Hence, environmental treaty participation primarily involves the government of a state as the
main actor (Wangler, Altamirano-Cabrera and Weikard, 2013).2 However, a country’s executive is also influ-
2Participation, i.e., ratification, is thus usually initiated and completed by the executive. In several countries, however,
state constitutions require explicit legislative approval for ratification decisions, making treaty participation depending on the
final action of the legislative branch. Our argument focuses on the executive, however, as it is generally more plausible that
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enced by its domestic constituency (e.g., Putnam, 1988) and, as Bernauer et al. (2010), for example, show,
governments care about their reputation in the international arena. We argue in the following that these
international and domestic constituencies impose costs on a government in case of non-compliance with an
environmental treaty – and the design, i.e., the degree of legalization of an agreement as well as the form
of government of a focal country determine the substance of these audience costs. Ultimately, we develop
a theoretical argument that leads to the empirical implication that environmental agreements with a larger
share of democratic members are less likely to be characterized by hard law due to a self-selection process
into participation.
Starting with the design of an international environmental agreement, we focus on the distinction between
hard law and soft law (e.g., Abbott et al., 2000; Abbott and Snidal, 2000; Shaffer and Pollack, 2010, 2011).
These concepts pertain to the underlying dimension of the degree of legalization, and they are defined
according to obligation, precision, and delegation (Abbott et al., 2000; Abbott and Snidal, 2000). Of course,
there are potentially many different ways to design an institution and all of these features may perform
different tasks. But their underlying latent dimension is about the degrees of commitment, bindingness,
and constraint that are imposed on members. As a result, much of the previous literature (e.g., Goldstein
and Martin, 2000; Skjærseth, Stokke and Wettestad, 2006; Bernauer et al., 2013; Spilker and Koubi, 2016)
focuses on this soft vs. hard law distinction as a comparable and relatively easily measurable way to code
the design of an international agreement. First, obligation is defined by an institution’s degree of bondage
and commitment. Second, there is precision, i.e., the unambiguous definition of states’ required actions in
an issue area. High levels of precision narrow down the “scope for reasonable interpretation” (Abbott et al.,
2000, p.402). Finally, legalization entails delegation, which is about granting authority of implementation,
interpretation, and rule application to a third party (Abbott et al., 2000, p.401f). Thereby, states lose some
degree of sovereign decision-making. In light of this overview, an agreement is seen as “hard law,” if it
is highly legalized through (1) clear obligations, (2) precise and unambiguously defined rules, and (3) the
delegation of (some) authority to a third party. Conversely, a treaty is characterized by “soft law,” if some
or all of these features are missing.
The degree of legalization of an international agreement has several implications for states’ freedom in
decision-making and sovereignty (see von Stein, 2008). In general, hard law allows for little flexibility due
to its stronger commitment requirements and higher sovereignty costs: “hard law restricts actors” (Abbott
and Snidal, 2000, p.422). Conversely, soft law is most often not associated with obligatory and precise
commitments, but flexibility and few constraints on sovereignty and policy-making (see Downs, Rocke and
Barsoom, 1996; Rosendorff and Milner, 2001; Rosendorff, 2005; Skjærseth, Stokke and Wettestad, 2006;
Bernauer et al., 2013; Spilker and Koubi, 2016; Bo¨hmelt and Spilker, 2016). More specifically, on one hand,
more demanding obligations and stronger enforcement mechanisms limit states’ freedom in decision-making,
a (democratic) government is unlikely to consider submitting an agreement for ratification to its legislative if rejection by the
latter is to be anticipated.
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and the delegation of power makes it more difficult to interpret an agreement in a self-serving manner
(Rosendorff and Milner, 2001; Rosendorff, 2005). Furthermore, hard law may increase the reputational costs
a state will incur if it reneges on its commitments. On the other hand, countries find it arguably easier
to agree on a soft-law design, as it provides more opportunities for compromise. State leaders can then
adapt an environmental agreement in light of particular needs, which allows for discretion and flexibility in
implementing treaty commitments and to respond to unanticipated shocks or special domestic circumstances
(Skjærseth, Stokke and Wettestad, 2006, p.115).
Eventually, hard law is potentially more costly and less attractive to any (potential) member, not only
democracies (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, 1996; Abbott and Snidal, 2000; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal,
2001; Skjærseth, Stokke and Wettestad, 2006; von Stein, 2008; Spilker and Koubi, 2016).3 Goldstein and
Martin (2000, p.620) make the same claim when stating that “if agreements are impossible to breach, either
because of their level of obligation or because the transparency of rules increases the likelihood of enforcement,
elected officials may find that the costs of signing such agreements outweigh the benefits.” However, ex-ante,
this affects all states similarly, regardless of their form of government. What is the role of democracy then in
this context? Why may particularly democratic forms of government be reluctant to select themselves into
hard-law environmental agreements?
When subscribing to the claim that any political leader is primarily interested in retaining office and,
hence, political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005), policies should be made that are favorable to the
relevant domestic audience, i.e., those citizens that a leader needs for gaining and staying in office. That
is, leaders have to satisfy their selectorate and, more precisely, the winning coalition. The selectorate is
the set of people who have the ability to choose a country’s leader, while the winning coalition signifies the
portion of the selectorate that keeps a leader in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). The crucial point
is now that non-democratic regimes are generally characterized by smaller winning coalitions relative to the
selectorate, while democracies have larger groups to please in order to stay in office. This is because citizens
can participate more effectively in the leader-selection process: they can express their will on the performance
of a government more effectively and directly in democratic states through, e.g., domestic institutions such as
public referendums and elections. In turn, however, this implies that democratic leaders can also be removed
from office more easily if the winning coalition is dissatisfied with their policies.
Against this background, we argue that a “democratic self-selection mechanism” has been overlooked by
previous research: because of a democratic leader’s primary goal of retaining office and since there are higher
3This conclusion raises the question of why one would implement hard law at all. Why do states not always opt to design
agreements according to soft law? Soft law cannot be enforced and does not provide clear targets, which induces a lack of
credibility and makes soft law ill-suited for solving an underlying problem effectively. Hard law is potentially more effectively
able to address an underlying problem as it is “more credible” and can enforce that states reach the policy goals they agreed on.
Note that this points to the “rigidity and flexibility” trade-off widely discussed in the literature (see Downs, Rocke and Barsoom,
1996; Rosendorff and Milner, 2001; Rosendorff, 2005; Skjærseth, Stokke and Wettestad, 2006; Bernauer et al., 2013; Spilker and
Koubi, 2016): “soft law may not necessarily be effective in solving an underlying problem. However, it should appear attractive
to states due to its lower sovereignty costs. On the other hand, hard law is unlikely to be the most preferred option for states in
decision-making, although it is potentially better suited to effectively address the problem an institution has been created for
in the first place” (Bo¨hmelt and Spilker, 2016, p.74).
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costs stemming from international and, primarily, domestic audiences when not complying with international
commitments, democracies have an extra incentive to select themselves only into those treaties they will find
easier to comply with in the first place.4 That is, democracies do supposedly more likely and credibly fulfill
their international environmental commitments (see Martin, 1993, 2000; Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff,
2002). This also stems from the claim that they face higher audience costs if they do not keep their promises.
If this applies, however, it is likely that democracies might be more careful in terms of selecting what exactly
they commit to and participate in to begin with. In the words of Ba¨ttig and Bernauer (2009, p.303),
democratic leaders “who promise more than they can implement experience political costs, for example an
increasing risk of losing elections.” Correspondingly, we expect democracies to participate only in those
environmental treaties, which are expectedly easy to comply with – but these are unlikely to be hard-law
agreements.
In more detail, state governments and leaders, when considering tougher, i.e., hard-law standards while
anticipating that they may face problems in complying with these, are likely to face at least two risks.
First, violating such a treaty involves reputational costs for a country at the international level (international
audience costs), since this would signal to present as well as potential cooperation partners that a country does
not necessarily adhere to its international obligations (see also Hathaway, 2002). That is, not complying with
a treaty in one context may negatively affect cooperation prospects in other areas – not only environmental
ones, but also on trade, security, etc. – as the violating state might be seen as less reliable. Hence, agreement
non-compliance makes it likely that other states will reply in a non-cooperative way as well, and a state that
has previously violated an agreement will be less likely to participate in another treaty in the future. Any
benefits from international cooperation are then at risk (see also Chiba, Johnson and Leeds, 2015, p.970).
Due to the higher credibility of keeping international promises (Martin, 1993, 2000; Mansfield, Milner and
Rosendorff, 2002), the reputational damage would be higher for democracies.
Second, treaty violation imposes domestic audience costs. People at the domestic level as well might be
interested in having and keeping a positive reputation for their state in international affairs, including with
regard to compliance with international environmental agreements. In case this reputation is damaged by,
e.g., the violation of an international treaty, the public could be increasingly less supportive of the executive
and more willing to replace a leader by a new one who has a higher credibility of keeping promises at the
international level (Chiba, Johnson and Leeds, 2015, p.971). Recall here that it is easier and less risky to
remove a leader in a democratic regime and, hence, “having sullied a state’s reputation has a greater likelihood
of having negative consequences for a leader’s ability to stay in power in a democratic state than in a non-
4Clearly, however, the content of international environmental agreements and the issues they address may not be that
salient to the (domestic) audience. In fact, it may be suggested that the majority of the electorate is indifferent to these
policies. However, following Mattes, Leeds and Carroll (2015, p.283), we view states’ compliance patterns with international
environmental agreements “as providing an indirect reflection of the foreign policy position of a state,” which then corresponds
to the broad preferences of domestic groups for a good reputation in the international arena. Therefore, a country’s participation
in and compliance with international environmental agreements “is a latent indicator of its foreign policy orientation [...]; it is
a record of how the state wants to be seen by others, the international norms it finds acceptable, and the positions it is willing
to take publicly on a wide variety of issues” (Mattes, Leeds and Carroll, 2015, p.283).
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democratic state” (Chiba, Johnson and Leeds, 2015, p.971). And, in fact, recent research (e.g., Tomz, 2008,
2012) suggests that citizens concerned “with their state’s reputation for fulfilling past commitments will be
less likely to reelect a leader that violates international commitments, thus providing incentives for democratic
leaders to honor their international promises” (Chiba, Johnson and Leeds, 2015, p.968). As indicated above,
although international environmental agreements may not be that salient to domestic audiences, states’
compliance patterns with international environmental agreements can provide “an indirect reflection of the
foreign policy position of a state” (Mattes, Leeds and Carroll, 2015, p.283).
In fact, McGillivray and Smith (2008) show that citizens do benefit from punishing their leader and
potentially removing her from office in the event of treaty non-compliance and reputational damage caused
even if that treaty violation would lead to a better payoff for the country at large. It follows that when antic-
ipating these risks and being aware of international and, in particular, domestic audience costs, democratic
leaders – due to their higher degree of international accountability and stronger dependency on larger parts
of the population for political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005) – should be less likely to commit
to standards that make treaty compliance more challenging: that is, hard law. Ultimately, a larger share of
democracies among the states participating in an international environmental agreement will be more likely
to have implemented a design alternative that lowers the risk of agreement non-compliance and thus avoids
audience costs: that is, soft law.5 Hence, the empirical implication of our argument is that democracies
are less likely to participate in hard-law (more binding, more constraining, and more precise) environmental
agreements than soft law treaties.
4 Research Design
4.1 Data, Methodology, and Dependent Variable
The empirical test of our argument is based on the quantitative cross-sectional data set by Bernauer et al.
(2013) that provides information on treaty design features and degrees of legalization for 213 international
environmental agreements. According to Bernauer et al. (2013), these data focus on all international treaties
that were open for ratification globally between 1950 and 2000, while the number of participating states per
treaty is measured at the end of 2006. Agreements dealing only marginally with environmental issues or
those not open for participation globally, since they cannot attract members from the same population of
countries in a given year, are not part of the data. The variables in the data set have been compiled through
the analysis of the original treaty documents and texts, which do essentially not change over time.6 The
starting points for identifying the population of international environmental agreements for Bernauer et al.
(2013) have been CIESIN (2006) and Mitchell (2008).
5Note that this argument does not suggest that non-democratic regimes do not consider international or domestic audience
costs. However, these costs should be, ceteris paribus, higher in the case of democracies.
6Hence, the purely cross-sectional nature of the data is not an empirical shortcoming.
Democratic Self-Selection into Environmental Treaty Design 10
The treaty as such is the unit of analysis in this data set, which implies that the final data we employ
also comprise 213 observations. Next to the “core agreements” (or framework conventions), the data also
include protocols, but omit amendments as these are usually only minor adjustments to treaties.7 To the best
of our knowledge, although Bernauer et al. (2013) have not updated their environmental treaty data since
publication, their data are the only source with comprehensive and reliable information for our theoretical
concepts of interests, i.e., most importantly treaty design features and participation statistics. In addition,
next to our substantive interest in environmental politics, restricting the analysis to one policy area further
allows us to control for the impact of unit heterogeneity to a large degree.
Against this background, to capture how democracies are associated with the degree of legalization (e.g.,
Abbott et al., 2000; Abbott and Snidal, 2000; Shaffer and Pollack, 2010, 2011), we rely on the modeling
approach and methodology suggested in Chiba, Johnson and Leeds (2015). That is, next to the same unit
of analysis, i.e., the agreement as such,8 we created a dependent variable (described below) that measures
in a binary fashion whether a treaty is coded as hard law or soft law. Due to the dichotomous nature
of this outcome variable, we use logistic regression models and employ robust standard errors to address
heteroscedasticity. The main explanatory variable also follows Chiba, Johnson and Leeds (2015) in that we
created an item on the proportion of democratic states that participate in a treaty by the end of 2006. We
explain this variable’s operationalization below in detail as well. Finally, we also take into account that states
must choose to participate in an environmental agreement in the first place, i.e., before considering the design
characteristics of that institution, and make use of a two-part model to this end (Chiba, Johnson and Leeds,
2015). The results for that model are presented in the appendix.
Coming to our dependent variable, we rely on Abbott et al. (2000) and Abbott and Snidal (2000) who
define legalization as a system of institutionalized rules, norms, and regulations that characterize a treaty
along obligation, precision, and delegation. Spilker and Koubi (2016) argue that four variables in the data by
Bernauer et al. (2013) capture these dimensions and, in turn, whether an environmental agreement can be
classified as hard law or soft law. With regard to obligation, we use an item that measures whether the treaty
itself establishes an enforcement mechanisms (1) or not (0) and whether the agreement has any monitoring
provisions (1) or not (0), respectively. The rationale for using these variables is that treaties only impose a real
obligation on their members when rule compliance can be monitored and enforced. Enforcement mechanisms
exist for 65 out of 213 treaties, while monitoring devices are given for 66 agreements. The Kyoto Protocol ’s
Subsidiary Body for Implementation, for example, monitors and enforces its goals. Second, in terms of
precision, we consider a dichotomous variable receiving the value of 1 if a treaty specifies quantitative targets
or clear provisions. Ambiguous or no specifications at all of what has to be achieved are coded as 0. For
instance, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer specifies that “from 1991 to
1992 its [chlorofluorocarbon] levels of consumption and production of the controlled substances in Group
7Note that the appendix provides a robustness check that also omits protocols.
8Chiba, Johnson and Leeds (2015) focus on the selection of democracies into certain types of military alliances.
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I of Annex A do not exceed 150 percent of its calculated levels of production and consumption of those
substances in 1986.” It is, therefore, a very precise agreement. In our sample, 160 out of 213 treaties are
characterized as “precise.” Finally, delegation is captured by a variable on whether a treaty provides a
third-party dispute settlement body. There are many different types of dispute settlement mechanisms: some
agreements appoint external bodies, resolve issues through the International Court of Justice, or have internal
negotiation procedures in place. Our variable receives a value of 1 if an agreement provides guidelines on
how disputes should be dealt with (0 otherwise). 120 treaties have such provisions.
Based on these four variables, we created the aggregated index Hard Law that receives a value of 1 if
any three of the four items or all four variables are coded as 1 (0 otherwise). In our sample, 104 out of 213
treaties (48.83 percent) are hard-law agreements. This aggregation approach is also based on Spilker and
Koubi (2016) and, as we model variation in it, does clearly not assume that it is exogenously given.9 In
fact, we seek to examine the endogeneity surrounding it, since we focus on the self-selection of democracies
into agreements, depending on their degree of legalization. The following table illustrates the coding of our
dependent variable via some prominent treaties in our data set (see also Spilker and Koubi, 2016, p.231).
Table 1: Examples of Hard Law / Soft Law Coding
Treaty Name Hard Law Enforcement Monitoring Precision Delegation
UNFCCC Framework Conv. 0 0 1 0 1
UN Law of the Sea Conv. 1 0 1 1 1
Antarctic Treaty 1 0 1 1 1
International Protection of Birds Conv. 0 0 0 0 0
International Atlantic Tuna Conservation Conv. 0 0 1 1 0
Conv. on the High Seas 0 0 0 0 0
Conv. on Persistent Organic Pollutants 1 1 1 1 1
Conv. on Biological Diversity 1 0 1 1 1
Energy Charter Treaty 0 0 0 1 1
Conv. = Convention; 1 = Yes; 0 = No.
4.2 Proportion of Democracies and Control Covariates
Our main explanatory variable pertains to the share of democratic states that participate in a particular
environmental agreement by 2006, i.e., have ratified it (and this decision is in force) by 2006. For this item’s
operationalization, we counted the number of treaty members (ratifiers) in 2006 that are democratic and
divided this by the total number of states that have participated in (ratified) an environmental agreement by
the end of 2006. The rationale behind this operationalization is based on Chiba, Johnson and Leeds (2015) and
Pevehouse (2005): democracies can influence treaty design according to their relative weight in membership,
which Pevehouse (2005) calls “democratic density.” With a larger share of agreement membership, it is likely
to be easier for democratic states to “impose” their design preferences (see also Grigorescu, 2007, 2010).
In order to identify democracies, we use the data from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010)10 who classify
a regime as a democracy if all of the following criteria are met: (1) the chief executive must be chosen by
9We also return to this issue in the appendix when discussing the two-stage model.
10See also Przeworski et al. (2000).
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popular election or by a body that was itself popularly elected; (2) the legislature must be popularly elected;
(3) there must be more than one party competing in the elections; and (4) an alternation in power under
electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent to office must have taken place (Cheibub,
Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010, p.69). This main explanatory variable, Proportion of Democracies, ranges from
0 (only non-democratic states participate in an agreement by 2006) to 1 (only democracies participate in an
environmental treaty by the end of 2006). The classification of states into democracies and non-democratic
states is based on 2006 values, i.e., the year in which we measure countries’ participation.11
We also control for a broad set of alternative determinants of the degree of legalization and, hence, the
design of environmental treaties as well as states’ decision to participate in environmental treaties. These
controls are primarily based on Bernauer et al. (2013) and Spilker and Koubi (2016), but also derived from
earlier studies analyzing states’ commitments to international environmental problem-solving efforts (e.g.,
Fredriksson and Gaston, 2000; Neumayer, 2002a,b; Murdoch, Sandler and Vijverberg, 2003; Beron, Murdoch
and Vijverberg, 2003; Roberts, Parks and Va´squez, 2004; Fredriksson, Neumayer and Ujhelyi, 2007; von
Stein, 2008; Bernauer et al., 2010; Perrin and Bernauer, 2010; Bernauer et al., 2013; Mansfield, Milner and
Rosendorff, 2002; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006, 2008; Lantis, 2009; Lupu, 2014; Pollack, 2015). First,
different treaties became open to ratification at different points in time and, thus, vary in the time elapsed in
which joining an agreement was possible. Controlling for the age of a treaty seems also crucial when assuming
that states’ willingness or capacity to implement hard-law designs may have changed over time. Therefore,
we control for the age of an environmental agreement, which is operationalized as the time elapsed since a
treaty was open for ratification until 2006. We additionally include the squared term of Treaty Age to allow
for a curvilinear impact on the likelihood of hard-law design (see Carter and Signorino, 2010).
Second, we control for the total number of countries that participate in an environmental agreement. This
item is based on the data from Bernauer et al. (2013) who have coded the number of states that joined a
treaty by the end of 2006. States’ participation decisions might be influenced by other countries’ choices (e.g.,
Bernauer et al., 2010; Perrin and Bernauer, 2010). Due to the diffusion mechanisms of learning, emulation,
and perhaps even competition, a state might find continued participation more attractive if a large number
of other states do so (see, e.g., Gilardi, 2010, 2012).
Finally, we include binary variables that control for specific issue areas. This set of control variables is
based on the claim that an institution’s underlying problem structure influences the design of an agreement
and participation patterns (e.g., Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001; Mitchell, 2006). Miles et al. (2001),
for instance, use incongruity, asymmetry, and the cumulative cleavage structure to determine the level of
“malignancy,” which they combine with “uncertainty” in order to operationalize environmental problems (see
11Ideally, we would focus on ratifications at the time of drafting an agreement or only of those states that participated in
designing a treaty. The lack of coding in Bernauer et al. (2013) prevents us from doing so, however. Still, as countries have
the possibility of leaving international agreements or changing their design (Chiba, Johnson and Leeds, 2015; Pevehouse, 2005),
analyzing their participation in a treaty by the end of 2006 fulfills the same purpose and should equally allow us to assess
whether environmental agreements with a larger share of democratic members are less likely to be characterized by hard law
due to a self-selection process into participation.
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also Bo¨hmelt and Pilster, 2010). While the data from Bernauer et al. (2013) do not include variables that
measure, e.g., the level of malignancy or uncertainty directly, they contain information on the respective issue
area an institution deals with. More specifically, we include dummy variables that indicate whether a treaty
addresses (1) matters of environmental pollution, (2) the protection of endangered species, microorganisms,
and wildlife, (3) nuclear energy issues within the environmental sphere, and (4) particular ecosystems such
as desertification, barren land, or wetlands. We use these variables as proxies for the different problem
structures environmental treaties may have, since Miles et al. (2001) show that an institution’s underlying
problem structure does indeed vary over issues. In turn, participation and design might be influenced by
these issue areas. For example, nuclear energy issues have been a particular salient topic especially during
the early decades of our observation period. It may then be less likely that agreements dealing with this issue
area are characterized by hard law as it constrains countries’ decision-making power and sovereignty more
than soft law does.
5 Empirical Findings
Table 2 summarizes the main models of our empirical analysis. The first model focuses on Proportion
of Democracies as the only explanatory variable. Clarke (2005, 2009), for example, argues that control
variables may increase the bias in model estimates, and not decrease it, under specific circumstances. Model
2 then drops the main independent variable and incorporates the control covariates only. Finally, Model 3
constitutes our core model as both the main explanatory item and the controls are jointly considered. For
assessing the models’ fit, we report logarithmic (pseudo) likelihoods, χ2 test statistics, and the area under the
Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve. The latter is based on an in-sample prediction approach and
theoretically varies between 0.5 (no predictive power) and 1.0 (perfect predictive power). Since coefficients
in non-linear models such as the logistic regression we use cannot be directly interpreted in terms of their
substance, we report first difference estimates in Table 3 (for the control variables) and predicted probabilities
of hard law in Figure 1 (for Proportion of Democracies). To assess the robustness of our results, we examined
various alternative model specifications, which are summarized in the appendix. The findings from these
robustness checks further support the results discussed in the following.
First, the models in Table 2 provide strong support for our theory. Regardless of the model specification,
Proportion of Democracies exerts a negative and highly significant impact on the likelihood of hard law.
Our main explanatory variable also contributes to the model fit as demonstrated by the difference in the
area-under-curve statistics. For example, this statistic increases by 0.045 units when changing from Model
2 to Model 3. In more substantive terms, Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities for Hard Law=1 under
two different scenarios: first, when Proportion of Democracies receives the value of 1, i.e., an environmental
treaty comprises only democracies; and, secondly, when Proportion of Democracies=0, i.e., when there are
no democratic members at all in an institution. We calculated these substantive quantities of interest while
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Table 2: Hard-Law Treaties and the Proportion of Democracies
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Proportion of Democracies −1.812*** −1.743***
(0.542) (0.606)
Treaty Age −0.094** −0.107**
(0.042) (0.046)
Treaty Age2 0.001* 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
Treaty Group Size 0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.004)
Pollution 0.685** 0.673**
(0.330) (0.326)
Habitat 0.816** 0.815**
(0.353) (0.363)
Nuclear 0.151 0.207
(0.435) (0.453)
Species −0.401 −0.367
(0.367) (0.367)
Constant 1.252*** 0.849 2.195***
(0.411) (0.580) (0.837)
Observations 213 213 213
Log Pseudolikelihood -141.897 -133.471 -128.923
Prob > χ2 0.001 0.001 0.001
Area under ROC Curve 0.611 0.700 0.745
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
holding all other variables constant at their median values along the lines of King, Tomz and Wittenberg
(2000). As the probabilities are therefore simulated parameters, we present density plots that capture their
distribution, and the horizontal bars at the bottom of Figure 1 signify the point estimates of the two sce-
narios’ probabilities and their 90 percent confidence intervals. When all states that have participated in an
international environmental agreement by the end of 2006 were democratic, the predicted probability for this
treaty being of a hard-law nature is around 25 percent. Conversely, this probability increases by about 39
percentage points to 64 percent when there was not a single democracy among the members of an environ-
mental agreement in 2006, i.e., when changing Proportion of Democracies to 0. Note that the horizontal bars
for the probabilities’ point estimates and confidence intervals do not overlap, which means that the difference
between the two scenarios’ predicted probabilities is statistically significant.
Ultimately, we conclude that our empirics strongly and robustly suggest that democratic leaders may
expect to experience higher costs, internationally and even more so at the domestic level, for violating
environmental agreements than non-democratic regimes. Hence, they are more inclined to participate in
international commitments that can be complied with more easily – and, thus, they only implement or
participate in treaty designs that are less binding, less precise, and more flexible, i.e., all sorts of characteristics
that are not compatible with hard law. And this induces that the proportion of democratic members in
an environmental agreement is negatively associated with hard-law treaty designs due to the self-selection
mechanism we outlined in the theory section above.
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Figure 1: Predicted Probabilities of Hard Law for Minimum and Maximum Values of Proportion of Democ-
racies
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Note: First difference estimate, i.e., the predicted probability of hard law when moving Proportion of Democracies from its
minimum to its maximum while holding all other variables at their median values, is at -0.387 (90 percent confidence interval:
[-0.587; -0.171]). Mean point estimate for Proportion of Democracies=0 is at 0.640 (90 percent confidence interval: [0.445;
0.820]). Mean point estimate for Proportion of Democracies=1 is at 0.253 (90 percent confidence interval: [0.144; 0.386]).
Estimates are based on simulations (N=1,000 of simulated parameters), while holding all other variables at their median values.
Horizontal bars in the figure pertain to 90 percent confidence intervals of probabilities’ point estimates.
Coming to our control variables, Table 2 demonstrates that Pollution and Habitat achieve conventional
levels of statistical significance. All else equal, particularly treaties dealing with these kinds of underlying
problems are more likely to be characterized by hard law. More substantively, Table 3 shows that Pollution
has a first difference estimate of 0.157, i.e., the probability of hard-law design increases by about 16 percentage
points when raising Pollution from 0 to 1 (the value of 0 constitutes the reference category, i.e., mixed problem
types). Similarly, when increasing Habitat from 0 to 1, the likelihood of having a hard-law agreement is
raised by 19 percentage points. Somewhat surprisingly, Treaty Group Size is associated with an insignificant
coefficient estimate. Having said that, note that Treaty Group Size and Proportion of Democracies are
interlinked with each other as Treaty Group Size necessarily increases with the number of democratic states
that participated by the end of 2006.12 To examine the relationship between the two variables and their
impact on Hard Law more thoroughly, we thus interacted Treaty Group Size and Proportion of Democracies.
That is, we multiplied both variables and included the multiplicative term next to the other covariates into our
core model (see ?). However, the negative impact of Proportion of Democracies on Hard Law prevails even
with an interactive specification. Finally, the results for the treaty-age items are discussed in the appendix.
12We discuss the issue of multicollinearity further in the appendix.
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Table 3: Control Variables – Substantive Quantities of Interest
First Difference Confidence Interval
Treaty Group Size 0.150 [-0.227; 0.271]
Pollution 0.157 [0.025; 0.277]
Habitat 0.193 [0.054; 0.329]
Nuclear 0.046 [-0.117; 0.217]
Species -0.073 [-0.189; 0.047]
Calculations are based on Model 3.
Table entries are first difference estimates.
Calculations done while holding all other variables constant at their median values.
6 Conclusion
The empirical findings confirm our theoretical expectation that environmental agreements with a larger
share of democratic members are less likely to be characterized by hard law due to a self-selection process into
participation. Our argument explicitly sought to link agreements’ degrees of legalization with regime type and
to examine variation in treaties’ design (e.g., Abbott et al., 2000; Abbott and Snidal, 2000; Shaffer and Pollack,
2010, 2011). Eventually, our theory focused on international and, particularly, domestic audience costs, which
are likely to be higher in democratic states when violating international agreements. Democratic leaders are
likely to anticipate this and will participate only in those treaty designs that allow for more flexibility, which
constrain less in terms of sovereignty, and that impose fewer costs in case of non-compliance: and these are
soft-law agreements.
The empirical analysis built on data by Bernauer et al. (2013) that provide information on 213 global
environmental treaties since 1950. While controlling for several alternative determinants of hard-law design
and treaty participation (ratification), the main analyses and the additional checks in the appendix provide
robust support for a negative impact of Proportion of Democracies on Hard Law. Several important impli-
cations follow from our work both for the academic literature and policymakers. First, our statistical models
address associations between variables, not causation. We also studied the macro-level or net implications
of a phenomenon in the context of environmental politics and, particularly, democracies’ ratification of in-
ternational agreements. To this end, we concentrated on a macro-level theoretical framework that attempts
to explain events essentially consisting of a series of individual decisions. The empirical findings are, in
principle, consistent with our arguments, but it may also be the case that factors like more neoliberal types
of governance or voluntarism play important roles. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to successfully
link macro-level theories to individual-level assessments of motives and preferences, a more detailed empirical
analysis at the micro, i.e., individual, level seeking to address more thoroughly the underlying causal mecha-
nisms could further improve our knowledge of democracies’ attitudes toward hard and soft law, and how this
relationship affects treaty participation.
Second, while our work focuses on international environmental agreements, the findings could possibly
be extended to other issue areas. Chiba, Johnson and Leeds (2015), for instance, show that similar patterns
are at work for military alliances. That said, additional empirical analyses in the context of trade or human-
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rights treaties might be an effort worth making, as the dynamics, interests, and decision-making processes
there might fundamentally differ from the environmental area we have focused on (see, e.g., Hathaway,
2002). Moreover, our analysis is based on treaties for the time period from 1950 to 2000, while members’
participation in these agreements has been coded until 2006. While it is unlikely that our results would
change when taking more recent data into account, updating the data set from Bernauer et al. (2013) seems
an effort worth making.
Third, our research demonstrates that the statement by Neumayer (2002a, p.139) only holds under some
conditions: “the spread of democracy around the world will lead to enhanced environmental commitment
worldwide.” Soft law is positively associated with democratic forms of government, hard law is not. In light
of this finding and when subscribing to the claim that hard law is generally more conducive to effectively
addressing environmental problems, our work also contributes to explaining why we sometimes observe a
significant “words-deeds” gap in environmental policy-making (Ba¨ttig and Bernauer, 2009). That is, democ-
racies are more likely to avoid hard-law commitments and pursue soft law instead, although the latter is
usually more likely to be less suitable for addressing environmental problems effectively (see Downs, Rocke
and Barsoom, 1996; Rosendorff and Milner, 2001; Rosendorff, 2005; Skjærseth, Stokke and Wettestad, 2006;
Bernauer et al., 2013; Spilker and Koubi, 2016). In the words of Chiba, Johnson and Leeds (2015, p.979),
“[w]hat is an advantage for democratic states in making their commitments credible (and thus attracting
partners to their cooperative endeavors) may simultaneously make democratic leaders reluctant to join in-
ternational commitments that require particularly broad or deep cooperation.” In addition, non-democratic
regimes might select themselves more often into hard law, but they lack either willingness or capacity to
uphold their claims. Ultimately, democracies tend to make promises that are shallow to begin with, while
non-democracies cannot or will not ensure compliance; this induces a net discrepancy between what countries
promise internationally and what is being delivered.
More generally, we thus add to the debate on “constraining and screening effects” of international insti-
tutions (von Stein, 2008): while democracies may be more credible and reliable in terms of upholding their
commitments, they carefully screen agreements first and systematically seek to avoid treaties that may seem
overly constraining. Separating these effects may be even more difficult, since screening is endogenous to
constraint (see also Chiba, Johnson and Leeds, 2015), but our research provides an explanation for why so
many democratic states are not associated with environmental improvement at the outcome level (Ward,
2008)13 – as they avoid hard-law treaties and soft-law agreements may be less adequate for having a signifi-
cant impact on environmental quality as such. That being said, our research also implies that if a democratic
leader actually does select her country into a hard-law agreement, she must be relatively certain about the
compliance with that agreement (see also Chiba, Johnson and Leeds, 2015, p.979).
Finally, for effectively increasing the attractiveness of more legalized international environmental agree-
13In the words of Ward (2008, p.386), “[a]lthough theory strongly suggests that liberal democracies should perform better
than autocracies on sustainability indicators, the empirical evidence is unclear.”
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ments – even in the eyes of democratic leaders – and, potentially, to improve their effectiveness, theoretical
and empirical work should seek to study more thoroughly, which design features are seen as most desirable
and implementable. To this end, we would obtain a better understanding of the conditions under which demo-
cratic states do participate in hard-law treaties and, as a result, also the conditions under which audience
costs deter democracies from entering arrangements. Ultimately, one might want to design treaty features
that more positively affect states’ incentive structures and, therefore, contribute to agreement participation in
and eventually the effectiveness of an institution. Such an analysis could also focus directly on international
bargaining processes and their timing with respect to relevant domestic policy-making processes.
We conclude this article by highlighting that the proportion of democratic states participating in an
international environmental agreement is negatively associated with hard-law treaty designs. The effect is
both significant and substantial. Further research should take this finding into account for analyzing screening
and selection effects in the context of international institutions more directly and jointly, and when exploring
design features that may eventually cancel out the negative impact on hard law that we identified.
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